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EXPLAINING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS: NIETZSCHE GETS HIS MBA
ERIC Boos'
Abstract
There has never been a better time to study the philosophy and ethical
theory of Friedrich Nietzsche. While the world adjusts to a global economic
catastrophe, rooted in the American banking industry's handling of
subprime mortgages, we would do well to predicate our predictions of the
global market's trajectory on Nietzsche's view of the human person and his
view of ethics. The failure of economics to identify, predict, and address
this crisis, particularly in light of the symptoms it shares with other
financial catastrophes, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Qwest, is evidence
that the traditional paradigms employed by economics are missing
something fundamental. It is this author's contention that what economics is
missing can be found in Nietzsche's work. The classic "master-slave"
formulation of Nietzsche's ethical perspective gives perfect expression of
not only the sub-prime mortgage and subsequent foreclosure scandal, but it
also provides a perfect cover for the legal and political fallout to date and,
more than likely, a window to future economic and social events. Given the
shocking magnitude of the problem and the recalcitrant attitude of the
American banking industry and its executives, who collect bonuses while
enforcing illegal foreclosure proceedings against hapless victims,
Nietzsche's usual reception as an extreme and hyperbolic harbinger of
moral discourse might be supplanted with a collegial curiosity if not a
heart-warming and hardy welcome. This article intends to highlight the
aspects of Nietzsche's ethical theory that are particularly evident in the
current economic crisis and point to a likely set of outcomes with regard to
the crisis. In so doing, this article will establish Nietzsche's relevance as a
1. Dr. Eric Boos has a Master's Degree in Applied Philosophy (Bowling Green State
University), a Doctorate in Philosophy (Marquette University), JD and LLM Degrees (University
of Wisconsin). Dr. Boos specializes in Legal Theory, Law, Economics and Development, and
International Human Rights Law, and works with multinational corporations in establishing social
responsibility programs. He will be teaching at St. Augustine University Law School in Mwanza,
Tanzania, in 2012-2013. Dr. Boos would like to thank Adam Mand, University of Wisconsin Law
School, for his assistance in researching and preparing this article for publication.
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practical course of study in MBA programs, law schools, business schools,
and college curriculums.
WHEN A HOUSE IS NOT A HOME: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC CRISIS
Most people are aware by now that the global economic crisis was
precipitated by the collapse of the housing market in the United States,
though few comprehend the relationship of the housing market to the
broader economy, and even fewer understand the nuances of the banking
and credit system that facilitated this collapse. How can extending home
loans to people with bad credit and who are likely to default on their
mortgages lead to a global economic crisis, particularly when creditors built
mechanisms into these risky loans to offset the anticipated losses?
By 2007, half of all mortgages in the United States (approximately 27
million) were subprime loans,2 with a combined value of $4.5 trillion.' By
comparison, all other US mortgage loans amounted to over $10 trillion.4
Yet, there is little doubt that subprime loans are the key to the 2008
financial collapse.' The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (hereinafter
FCIC) reiterated this in their final report: "[W]hile the vulnerabilities that
created the potential for crisis were years in the making, it was the collapse
of the housing bubble-fueled by low interest rates, easy and available
credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages-that was the spark."'
The collapse was not just of the American housing market and financial
institutions, it was truly a global phenomenon. The relatively simple
2. "Subprime loan" is the term used when a bank or credit agency lends money to a
borrower who does not qualify for a traditional mortgage loan because of bad credit from previous
payment delinquencies, lack of a down-payment or collateral, a poor debt-to-income ratio, or
other financial problems. Such clients pose a risk of nonpayment and are usually denied a loan
because if they default, the lender gets saddled with real property that often they must dispose of
at a loss. The process of foreclosing on such properties is costly and time-consuming and affects a
lender's profit margin and its own credit rating among investors. Borrowers with strong credit
histories and ample assets are "prime" and usually get loans based on the prime rate set by the
Federal Reserve. To offset the greater risk of lending money to "sub-prime" borrowers, banks
often charge them a higher rate of interest and often put them into adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs) which typically increase the initial interest rate of the loan by a considerable margin.
Thus, lenders built into the system a means of recuperating some of the anticipated losses from
granting risky loans.
3. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL INQUIRY REPORT, 451 (2011)
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (The Commission was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21) passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in
May 2009), available at http:www.fcic.gov/report/.
4. Id.
5. 0. C. FERRELL, JOHN FRAEDRICH & LINDA FERRELL, BUSINESS ETHICS, (South-Western
Cengage Learning, 7th ed. 2009) [hereinafter FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL]; see also Peter J.
Wallison's dissent from the majority opinion in the FCIC REPORT, supra note 3 at 443-538.
6. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xvi.
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problem of subprime lending somehow escalated to "trillions of dollars in
risky mortgages ... embedded throughout the system as mortgage-related
securities ... packaged, re-packaged, and sold to investors around the
world. The losses were magnified by derivatives such as synthetic
securities ... and the impact is likely to be felt for a generation."' The
scope and complexity of the financial crisis led the FCIC to say, "[W]e
have been at various times fascinated, surprised, and even shocked by what
we saw, heard, and read."8
In identifying the causes and conditions of the financial collapse, the
FCIC pointed to: the explosion of subprime lending and securitization,
predatory lending practices, unregulated derivatives, the Federal Reserve's
failure to stem the flow of the toxic mortgages, the financial institutions'
lack of due diligence in examining the mortgage securities they bought and
sold, and credit agencies covering the inherent risks and dangers in the
securities market by inflating credit ratings and ignoring the use of off-
balance sheet entities, over-the-counter derivatives, and participation in the
multi-trillion dollar repo lending market.' In a bold proclamation, dissent
and controversy notwithstanding,"o the FCIC stated quite emphatically:
"There were warning signs. The tragedy was that they were ignored. We
conclude this financial crisis was avoidable.""
This particular view serves as an underlying theme of this paper. If
7. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxiv (The Commission reiterated the global nature of the
problem by adding, "While many of these mortgages were kept on the banks' books, the bigger
money came from global investors who clamored to put their cash into newly created mortgage-
related securities.").
8. Id.
9. Id. at xvii-xviii.
10. Peter J. Wallison, a member of the FCIC wrote his own dissent, which is published along
with the FCIC REPORT, see id. at 431-538.
I1. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii. On the other hand, if this crisis was not
avoidable, we are left with a question that has plagued economics: why does economics fail to do
what good science does, which is provide laws, predict with precision and predict the unexpected,
unify diverse phenomena, and so on? For an excellent analysis of this, see HAROLD KINCAID, The
Empirical Presuppositions of Metaphysical Explanations in Economics, 78 THE MONIST: AN
INT'L QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 368-385 (1995). Kincaid examines the
views of philosophers of economics such as Alexander Rosenberg, Alan Nelson, John Dupre, and
Helen Boss, and argues that "metaphysical assumptions abound in economics, but they are
intimately tied to specific economic issues and must be evaluated accordingly." Claims that
modem economics fails because the essential predicates or kinds it identifies are not "natural
kinds" are inherently weak, argues Kincaid, because such metaphysical diagnosis ignores diversity
and wrongly treats economics as a homogenous whole. As Kincaid says, "lacking natural kinds is
not the best explanation for the alleged failure of economics." Whether or not the "kinds" that
modem economics identifies "cuts nature at the joints" is a fascinating discussion, and Kincaid
makes a very compelling argument for expanding the scope of criticism of economic theory to
include more of the empirical, local details, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. As useful as
Kincaid's arguments would be in helping us understand the dissenting view of Peter Wallison
from the majority opinion of the FCIC, this paper accepts the basic premise that the entire crisis
was avoidable and that it was very much the result of human action and inaction.
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indeed the financial crisis was avoidable, then how is it possible that it was
not avoided? Does not this position assume that at least some individuals
involved in the financial meltdown understood the possible (negative)
consequences and acted in spite of those consequences? The FCIC
answered this directly when it said, "[W]e do place special responsibility
with the public leaders charged with protecting our financial system, those
entrusted to run our regulatory agencies, and the chief executives of
companies whose failures drove us to crisis."" More specifically, "[T]he
captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored
warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving
risks . . . . Theirs was a big miss, not a stumble," concludes the FCIC. "
In spite of the FCIC's view that "the crisis was the result of human
action and inaction, not Mother Nature or computer models gone
haywire," 4 it warns against pinning "the crisis on mortal flaws like greed
and hubris," and encourages all concerned to view the crisis in the broader
philosophical context of "human nature and individual and societal
responsibility."" The FCIC provides the scope of its philosophical
consideration of the problem when it avers, "it was the failure to account for
human weakness that is relevant to this crisis."" This more general
philosophical problem is precisely what we intend to examine in this paper.
If the failure to account for this human weakness is at the core of the
financial crisis, then we must examine what means we have of knowing the
weakness and accounting for it in the future if we are to avert a similar
disaster. To begin, we must look more closely at the financial crisis and ask:
Why did this happen?
A simple answer to this question is that we developed an economy
around the exploitation of peoples' desires to own homes, which required a
loosening of the lending rules and led to a cultural shift in seeing homes as
commodities." In 1968, Congress chartered Fannie Mae, a stockholder-
12. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxiii.
13. Id. at xvii.
14. Id.
15. Id. at xxii-xxiii. This particular perspective is something we intend to examine
specifically in this paper. It is the main contention of this paper that the ethics of Friedrich
Nietzsche provide us with the best possible paradigm for understanding how the failure to account
for human weakness can result in something exactly like a global economic crisis. Nietzsche is the
only philosopher to conclude that human relationships are fundamentally that of "creditor and
debtor," and for this reason his philosophy of human nature is perfectly suited to explain an
economic crisis in which the root of the problem is subprime mortgages.
16. Id. at xxiii.
17. Owning a home has long been considered part and parcel of the "American Dream."
There is a certain ontological reality behind owning a home that is deserving of a more
philosophical treatment than we can give here. For our purposes, we assume the ontological
significance of home ownership and focus instead on how it has been exploited in the present
circumstances. Suffice to say, the majority opinion of the FCIC alludes to this ontological aspect
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owned corporation with the sole purpose to purchase and securitize
mortgages in order to ensure that funds would be available to institutions
that lend money to home-buyers. By 1970, the idea grew to include the
inauguration of Fannie Mae's brother corporation, Freddie Mac, as a way to
expand the secondary market for mortgages in the United States. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac bought mortgages on the secondary market and then
repackaged and sold them as mortgage-backed securities to investors on the
open market. In short, banks were encouraged to lend more freely to
borrowers for the purchase of homes with guarantees that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac would buy the mortgages from the banks. In receiving
immediate repayment of the original mortgage plus a profit by selling to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, banks had more money to lend to even more
borrowers. For their part, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sold securities to
investors that were backed by the money generated in home loan
repayment.
The entire system was based on peoples' desire to own homes of their
own in the first instance, and the belief (and trust) that such a desire would
impel borrowers to do whatever it took to stay in their homes due to the
threat of foreclosure always hanging over their heads." Freddie Mac and
when it states, "homes are the foundation upon which many of our social, personal, governmental,
and economic structures rest." FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. Then, the FCIC draws a most
revealing philosophical conclusion when it points out that the crisis relates directly to a shift from
the ontological value of a home to a more existential view of houses as commodities. In the words
of the FCIC: "Housing suddenly went from being part of the American Dream to house my family
to settle down-it became a commodity. That was a change in the culture . . . . It was sudden,
unexpected." FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6, quoting Interview with Angelo Mozilo, Sep. 24,
2010. Peter Wallison, in his dissent from the FCIC's majority view, specifically identifies the
Government's attempts to get more people into homes, a philosophy which precipitated the
loosening of lending rules, as the precise source of the global financial crisis. He points out that
the Government's efforts to increase home ownership through affordable housing goals succeeded
as ownership rates went from 64% in 1994 (where it had been for the preceding 30 years), to 69%
in 2004. His conclusion is that this 5% increase enveloped too many risky borrowers who
subsequently defaulted causing the entire system to collapse. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 456.
Wallison concludes, "but for" the 27 million toxic mortgages, we would not have had a financial
crisis. His analysis acknowledges the other contributing factors such as credit default swaps, but
he remains steadfast in pointing to the Government's role in loosening lending requirements
which encouraged 27 million risky mortgages. In other words, Wallison does not agree that there
was any exploitation-a view we shall challenge by specifically considering the conspicuous
absence of strategic defaults on underwater mortgages due to the social emphasis on the moral
responsibility of people to pay their debts vis-A-vis a banking industry that engaged in predatory
lending, illegal foreclosures, inflated earnings statements, shoddy accounting practices, and the
acceptance of federal bailout money.
18. The threat of foreclosure is a specific issue we intend to treat in this paper because it
underscores the manipulation of moral standards and values and as such bolsters a position put
forth by the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. As we shall see, the mortgage industry, the
Government of the United States, and the media have aided in the perpetuation of a psychology of
fear and moral reprobation regarding the repayment of debts. For a terrific treatment of this from
the perspective of legal psychology see Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking A way:
Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971,
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Fannie Mae convinced investors that profits would continue to rise as the
overall economy improved and more and more people would be able to take
on a mortgage and buy a home.
Overconfidence in the system and desire to increase corporate profits
resulted in a variety of corporate and accounting improprieties. In 2003,
Freddie Mac revealed that it had misstated earnings by $5 billion, and by
2004, both companies were under investigation for illegal accounting
practices and "phantom profits." 9 Both companies continued to donate
large sums of money for various political candidates and lobby for more
deregulation of the mortgage loan industry. Each step of the way, they
continued to expand their share of the subprime loan market and hence their
collateralized debt obligations. Prior to their trouble in 2008, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac guaranteed about half of the $12 trillion mortgage market
in the United States.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not the only subprime games in
town.20 Angelo Mozilo co-founded another lending institution, Countrywide
Financial, which specialized in subprime loans. At the same time, Mozilo
diversified into the securities market-which helped expedite the flow of
mortgage-backed securities, thus freeing up more money to loan to
individual borrowers. Within a few decades, Countrywide had become the
largest single provider of home loans in the United States. In 1992,
Countrywide initiated a program called "House America" that enabled more
consumers to qualify for home loans. Countrywide had the distinction of
being the number one provider of home loans to minorities in the United
States and prided itself in lowering the barriers of homeownership for low-
income individuals. By 1993, its loan transactions reached the $1 trillion
mark. From 2000 to 2006, Countrywide made an astounding $2 trillion in
home loans.2' Countrywide was the darling child in the mortgage loan
industry. Between 1982 and 2003, Countrywide delivered a 23,000% return
to investors.22
Returns of this magnitude had every investor's attention, and when
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, lowered the
Federal Funds rate from 6.5% to 1.0% between 2000 and 2003, a multitude
971-1023 (2010) [hereinafter White].
19. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Lenders: Still Not Safe, BuSINESSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2008, at 28.
The author writes that phantom profits are when mortgage lenders "sell risky adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs) for which borrowers pay less than the total interest owed each month, yet the
lenders report the full amount of the interest as income .. . .in essence, lenders were counting their
chickens before they hatched."
20. Ferrell, Fraedrich & Ferrell provide a good account of Countrywide's involvement in the
mortgage and housing crisis; see FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5.
21. Michael Mandel & Peter Coy, The Feds Revolution, BusINESSWEEK, Mar. 31, 2008, at
32.
22. FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at 391.
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of investors looked to Wall Street for alternatives and many jumped into
mortgage-backed securities.23 In 2000, there was a "global pool of money"
of about $36 trillion in fixed-income securities. 24 This money essentially
represented "the world's savings."25 Insurance companies, pension fund
managers, central banks from other countries, investment bankers, and
others joined in the speculative venture of mortgaged-backed securities.
Money that would normally have been invested conservatively in treasury
bills or municipal bonds suddenly found its way into mortgage-backed
securities so that by 2007, the global pool of money (the "world's savings")
had doubled to over $70 trillion.26 This is how the problem led to a global
economic crisis in 2008.
The huge returns on investments in mortgage-backed securities were
enough to blind investors and government officials alike against the
inherent risk of mortgage-backed securities and the many improprieties
being committed by banks and investment firms. In spite of multiple
investigations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Congress and Presidents
Clinton and G.W. Bush set aggressive goals to increase home ownership
and encouraged the purchase of more subprime loans from banks.27 During
the same period, the government eased restrictions on commercial banking
activity by signing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed part of the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.28 This repeal enabled commercial banks, like
Citigroup, to expand into other financial activities previously reserved for
investment banks, such as insurance and trading mortgage-backed
securities.
Initially, these securities were relatively safe investments. They were
built out of mortgages with big down payments from borrowers with steady
incomes and savings in the bank. So many mortgages were sold in an
attempt to satisfy investors' appetites that there came a point in 2003 where
just about every qualified mortgage-seeker had already obtained one. The
demand for these securities remained, however, resulting in a loosening of
the mortgage qualification guidelines in order to lend to less financially
qualified people. Mortgage lenders came out with the "stated income,
verified asset loan" (SIVA) approach, which meant a borrower did not have
23. Federal Reserve Board, Monetary Policy and Open Market Operations,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/ monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
24. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, Chicago Public Radio (Dec, 21, 2010),
available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/sites/default/files/355_transcript.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxvii.
28. Mark Lander & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Can Share the Blame for Financial Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-
prexy.4.16321064-.html?pagewanted=1.
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to provide paycheck stubs and W-2 forms to obtain a mortgage. Borrowers
could simply state their income and show that they had money in the bank.
This was still not enough to satisfy the demand for mortgage-backed
securities.
In order to produce more mortgages and securities, the qualification
guidelines were progressively loosened until, eventually, borrowers could
obtain a loan with virtually "no income and no assets" (NINA)-all that
was required to obtain a mortgage was a credit score. Among mortgage
lenders, Countrywide was notorious for processing these "liar loans." But
some within the organization did have their doubts. According to the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, "as early as September 2004,
Countrywide executives recognized that many of the loans they were
originating could result in 'catastrophic consequences. "'29
Countrywide was certainly not alone in the use of liar loans, as they had
certain obvious benefits. 30 The lenders raised the up-front costs of these
extremely risky loans and pocketed commissions and bonuses, and then
passed the risk by selling them to Wall Street firms, who in turn sold them
to global investors. The total amount in losses just from liar loans could be
over $100 billion.3 '
The demand for mortgage-backed securities could not be easily
satisfied, so mortgage lenders resorted to another tactic: appealing to the
wanton desire of middle and upper-middle class Americans to have bigger
and better homes with a variety of subprime loan alternatives. 32 A Wall
Street Journal study revealed that from 2004-2006, the rate of middle- and
upper-income subprime loan borrowers rose dramatically. During the early
to mid-2000s, when real estate prices were booming and confidence levels
were high, even clients who could have qualified for regular loans chose to
take out subprime loans to finance their real estate speculations. By the
29. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxii.
30. It has been estimated that 90% of liar loan applicants overstated their income, with three
out of five overstating it by at least 50%. It is unlikely that such rampant dishonesty could have
occurred without the mortgage companies' awareness, if not their collaboration. See FERRELL,
FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at 389.
31. Id. Countrywide is still under investigation regarding the liar loans they generated before
they were bought out by Bank of America in 2008. There is some question as to whether
Countrywide assisted borrowers in falsifying information on its mortgage applications. Likewise,
individual borrowers have accused Countrywide of predatory lending saying that the company
misled them and induced them into taking on mortgages that the company knew they could not
handle.
32. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. The FCIC identifies a number of these new loan
packages. "The securitization machine began to guzzle these once-rare mortgage products with
their strange sounding names: Alt-A, 10 (interest only), low-doc, no-doc, ninja (no income, no
job, no assets) loans, 2-28s and 3-27s, liar loans, piggyback second mortgages, payment options or
pick-a-pay adjustable rate mortgages, exploding ARMs."
33. FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at 385.
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first half of 2005, more than one out of every ten home sales was to an
investor, speculator, or someone buying a second home. "Bigger-is-better"
was the trend and even the structures themselves ballooned in size; the floor
area of an average new home grew by 15% to 2,277 square feet in the
decade from 1997 to 2007.34
Not only were middle and upper class borrowers buying bigger and
better homes, flipping houses, and buying second homes as investments,
they were taking advantage of the new lending practices to refinance in
order to have cash to:
[S]end their kids to college, pay medical bills, install designer
kitchens with granite counters, take vacations, or launch new
businesses .. . and pay off credit cards. Survey evidence shows that
about 5% of borrowers pulled out cash to buy a vehicle and about
40% spent the cash on a catch-all category including tax payments,
clothing, gifts, and living expenses." Refinancing went from $460
billion in 2000 to $2.8 trillion in 2003.36
The rewards realized from mortgage-backed securities overwhelmed
the risk. Options Group, which computes compensation figures for
investment banks, examined mortgage-backed securities sales and trading
desks at eleven commercial and investment banks from 2005 to 2007. It
found that associates had average annual base salaries between $65,000 and
$90,000, but received bonuses that often exceeded their base salaries. Vice
presidents averaged base salaries and bonuses from $200,000 to $1.15
million. Directors averaged anywhere from $625,000 base salaries plus
bonuses to $1.625 million total compensation. At the very top were people
like Dow Kim, the head of Merrill Lynch's Global Markets and Investment
Banking segment, who got a base salary of $350,000 a year plus a $35
million bonus." At the very same time, Merrill Lynch began losing
billions-a reflection that the system was not sustainable.
Sensing the instability of a system based on the housing market-with
its relatively static number of people needing mortgages, or second
mortgages for bigger homes and second homes, a surplus of new housing
built by overly eager contractors that drown home values, and a high
34. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 118.
38. Id. at 259. By October 24, 2008, Merrill Lynch was forced to make a $1 billion write-
down on subprime mortgages and a $6.9 billion write-down on credit default options for a net loss
of $2.3 billion in the third quarter of that year. This reflects the instability of the system and the
magnification of subprime mortgages problem.
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percentage of likely defaults in the offing 39-a team of math whizzes at J.P.
Morgan pioneered a new financial instrument called a credit default swap
(CDS).40 Like ordinary derivatives, the CDS is a form of insurance against
sudden change in value due to underlying variables. The difference is that
these are "swapped" or traded between financial institutions or sold to third-
party investment firms. By 2007, there were $57 trillion worth of CDS
contracts globally and their reach was pervasive-including public sector
and non-profit organizations whose portfolio managers tried to ride the
wave of high returns unbeknownst to the individual investors. As Ferrell,
Fraedrich & Ferrell point out, "[T]he use of credit default swaps became so
profitable that traders and managers lost sight of anything but their
incentives for selling these instruments."4 1
Congress stymied oversight of these instruments when they passed the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which allowed for the self-
regulation of derivatives, including credit default swaps.42 In April 2004,
the Securities and Exchange Commission decided to relax the net capital
rule, which enabled investment banks to substantially increase their
financial leverage and aggressively expand their issuance of mortgage-
backed securities.
Knowing the risk, but not willing to forgo the chance for huge profits,
bankers used the credit default swaps as a sort of insurance policy against
bad loans. Third-party investors would assume the risk of the massive
defaults on these loans in exchange for regular payments from the bank-
similar to insurance premiums. A bank, such as J.P. Morgan, would then get
to remove the risk from its books and free up reserves of capital-similar to
the method employed by Enron years earlier which led to its total
collapse.43
Some investment bankers-Goldman Sachs in particular-bet against
39. Id. at 216. Subprime mortgages remained below 10% of all mortgage originations until
2004, when they spiked to nearly 20% and remained there through the 2005-2006 U.S. housing
bubble. By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their
mid-2006 peak. This meant that borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who could not make the
higher payments once the initial grace period ended had a difficult time trying to refinance. Those
who could not refinance began to default. By 2007, about 20% of subprime ARMs were
delinquent or in foreclosure, and by 2009, that rose to 40%. See also FERRELL, FRAEDRICH &
FERRELL, supra note 5, at 385ff.
40. FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at ix.
41. FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at viii.
42. Interview by PBS Frontline with Brooksley Born, former chairperson, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (Aug. 28, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/waming/interviews/born.html#regprospects.
43. Credit default swaps are very similar to the "off-the-balance-sheet" partnerships
employed by Enron prior to its collapse. Tragically, the credit default swaps, in spite of the
similarity to Enron's activities, were not illegal as there was no specific regulatory oversight for
them.
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the very positions they were pushing on their customers." Credit default
swaps ballooned into a $62 trillion market before AIG, "something of a last
backstop in the CDS market," needed to be bailed out by American
taxpayers after it defaulted on $14 billion worth of credit default swaps it
had made to investment banks and many other entities.45 Warren Buffett,
who in early 2003 had called these unregulated instruments "financial
weapons of mass destruction," proved something of a prophet as the house
of cards built on subprime mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and
credit default swaps began to crumble and threatened to take the world
economy with it.46
The debt taken on by financial institutions had increased dramatically
during this time, from 63.8% of US gross domestic product in 1997 to
113.8% in 2007 when we hit the tipping point.4 7 In late 2007, foreclosure
rates skyrocketed and both borrowers and investors began to feel the
downside of subprime lending.48 Wary investors began to dump their
mortgage-backed securities, and major banks and investment firms such as
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers,
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo were
hemorrhaging money. Adding to the potential financial impact was the
$426 billion in second mortgages on the balance sheets of just four banks:
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup.4 9
Banks were clearly not the only losers in the subprime crisis, and,
considering the "bailouts" of many banks, they may not end up being losers
at all. Those with weak credit who did not really have the assets to afford
mortgages ended up in default and foreclosure."o Moody's estimated that
2.1 million families would be foreclosed on in 2011, and the Mortgage
44. A.O. Scott, Who Maimed the Economy, and How, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://movies.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/movies/08inside.html.
45. Matthew Phillips, The Monster That Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK (Sep. 2008),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/26/the-monster-that-ate-wall-street.html.
46. Id.
47. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii ("From 1978 to 2007 the amount of debt held by
the financial sector soared from $3 trillion to $36 trillion, more than doubling as a share of the
gross domestic product.").
48. Prior to 2007, the foreclosure rate in the United States was historically less than 1%; by
2009 that had risen to 2.2%. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 402. By 2009, 9.7% of all mortgages
were seriously delinquent or in foreclosure. Id. at 215. By the fall of 2010, 1 in every II
outstanding residential mortgages in the United States was at least one payment behind. Id.at 402.
49. Elizabeth Martinez, U.S. Foreclosures Soar, Housing Prices Slump, MORTGAGE
LENDING NEWS (Jan.3, 2011), http://www.mortgage lending news.com/ top-news/I 1936-us-
foreclosures-soar-housing-prices-slump.
50. The potential for the problem of predatory lending was recognized as early as June 1,
2000, when the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
issued a joint report on recommendations to curb predatory home mortgage lending. HUD
TREASURY TASK FORCE, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING (June 1, 2000),
available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html.
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Bankers Association, the industry trade group, said that the total number
threatened with losing their homes is four million. That would bring the
total number who lost or will lose their homes over the five-year period,
2007-2011, under the combined impact of financial collapse and economic
slump, to a staggering nine million families.
Aside from the foreclosure problem, there are those who refinanced
with adjustable rate mortgages who ended up with higher rates and those
who bought bigger, more expensive homes during this period who ended up
with "underwater mortgages" as housing prices and real estate values
plummeted.5 2 As of January 5, 2011, nearly one-quarter of all US
homeowners with mortgages (somewhere between eleven and fifteen
million borrowers) were "underwater," owing more than their homes were
worth.
The problem of "underwater mortgages," or mortgages in which the
borrowers owe more on the mortgage than the house is worth, presents us
with a specific challenge. As Peter Coy warned in his 2008 Business Week
article, Recession Time,
[I]t is extremely dangerous for there to be millions of homeowners
who have a clear financial incentive to abandon their homes
because they are worth less than the mortgages on them. Already
there are signs that the stigma of abandoning a home is fading. . . .
The entire capital of the U.S. banking system would be wiped out
many times over if everyone who was underwater on a mortgage
turned the keys over to their lenders.54
For now, the vast majority of borrowers whose mortgages are
underwater continue to pay on those mortgages even when a strategic
default is clearly in their best interest. " According to Brent White, the
51. Id.
52. An "underwater mortgage" means that the homeowner/borrower owes more on his/her
mortgage than the property is worth. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER
OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX
MONTHS 24 (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documentss/cop-100909-report.pdf
(reporting that between 15-18 million homeowners are underwater); see also FIRST AMERICAN
CORELOGIC, SUMMARY OF SECOND QUARTER 2009 NEGATIVE EQUITY DATA FROM FIRST
AMERICAN CORELOGIC (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www. facorelogic.com/uploadedFiles
/Newsroom/RESintheNews/FACL%20Negative%20Equity-final 081309.pdf (reporting that
15.2 million mortgages were underwater in the second quarter of 2009).
53. Alex Perillo, Home Team, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at A27, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/01/06/opinion/06perriello.html.
54. Peter Coy, Recession Time, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2008, at 42-43, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_12/b4076040784032.htm.
55. "Strategic default" is the term used to identify a mortgage borrower's acquiescence to the
foreclosure process by non-payment. The sharp decline in real property values has meant that
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limited number of strategic defaults is the result of a desire on the part of
homeowners to avoid the shame and guilt associated with foreclosure and a
fear over the perceived consequences of foreclosure.56 However, the
possibility that more borrowers might exercise the strategic default option
has prompted something of a social backlash from politicians, the banking
industry, the media, and others, who insist that borrowers honor their debts
and pay their mortgages as a matter of moral propriety. As White contends,
[T]hese emotional constraints [shame and fear] are actively
cultivated by the government, the financial industry, and other
social control agents in order to induce individual homeowners to
act in ways that are against their own self-interest . . .. Unlike
lenders who seek to maximize profits irrespective of concerns about
morality or social responsibility, individual homeowners are
encouraged to behave in accordance with social and moral norms
that require individuals to keep their promises and honor financial
obligations."
Fear of an increase in strategic defaults prompted public admonition
from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, who declared in a televised
speech: "[A]ny homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but
chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculator-
and one who is not honoring his obligations."" Though directed at those
who might possibly be considering a strategic default at that time, Secretary
Paulson acknowledged that subprime mortgages comprised only 13% of all
outstanding mortgages and these accounted for only half of all foreclosure
starts in the third quarter of 2007. More importantly, those whose
mortgages were underwater were more than likely people who held
subprime adjustable rate mortgages, which made up only 6.5% of all
mortgages.
borrowers owe more on the home than it is actually worth and they would be much better off
walking away from the home under the terms of the mortgage. The default is "strategic" in the
sense that they would be much better off economically by purchasing a different home while
property values are low, or renting a property while they re-establish themselves economically. A
strategic default is very similar to the idea of an "efficient breach" sometimes used by businesses
when the original terms of a contract create a disproportionate advantage for one party. However,
unlike business contracts which can include liquidated damages clauses, mortgage contracts
generally do not include any penalty for breach by the disadvantaged party. Hence, the interesting
question is why more mortgage borrowers do not make use of the strategic default option. This is
the precise question that Brent White examines in his article. See White, supra note 18.
56. Id at 971-72.
57. Id.
58. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Housing and Mortgage
Market Update Before the National Association of Business Economists (Mar. 3, 2008), available
at http://www.ustreasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ hp856.aspx.
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Secretary Paulson was not the only public figure that joined the chorus
promoting mortgage payments as "moral obligations." While praising the
virtue of homeowners who pay their mortgages each month, President
Barack Obama lamented the erosion of our "common values" by those who
irresponsibly borrowed beyond their means. 9 The comments by the
President and other political figures were mild compared to "the media
invective toward those who strategically walk away from their mortgages.
Such individuals are portrayed as unseemly, offensive, and unethical, and
likened to deadbeat dads who walk out on their children or to those who
would have given up and just handed Europe over to the Nazis."" White
points out in his research that the media has worked to make people who
consider strategic default feel like the "most despicable members of
society."61 The consistent message from both government and the media is
that "walking away [from a mortgage] is not a responsible choice and
should be avoided at all costs."62
This campaign, or "moral suasion," as White calls it, has resulted in
keeping sentiment opposed to helping individual homeowners." "It is not
just the media and the government that act as norm enforcers, but also
individuals."' A 2008 Harris Interactive survey reported 42% of people felt
that the US government should not help individual homeowners who were
in danger of losing their homes.65 As White says, "even sympathy for those
who default because of predatory lending is frequently lacking."66
In spite of the possible social benefits of helping borrowers restructure
their mortgages and state and federal government attempts to provide
financial incentives to encourage banks to adjust interest rates, spread loan
59. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on the Housing
Mortgage Crisis at Dobson High School (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://whitehouse.gov/the
press office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-the-mortgage-crisis/.
60. White, supra note 18, at 998 (citing Cavuto: The Deal: Walk Away from Your Home (Fox
Business television broadcast Feb. 19 2009), http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/3883581/walk-away-
from-your-home/; The Mike Gallagher Show (Youwalkaway.com May 1, 2009), 60 Minutes: The
U.S. Mortgage Meltdown (CBS television broadcast May 25, 2008)
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id-4126094n&tag-related).
61. White, supra note 18, at 999.
62. Id. at 1000-01. In spite of the fact that strategic default is legal and in most cases the most
rational choice, White points out in his research that most people with underwater mortgages are
not defaulting. White points out many of the psychological, social, political and philosophical
factors, but none is as powerful as the "moral suasion" of the "major socializing agents in the
United States."
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Coy, supra note 54.
66. White gives a very detailed account of how the government, the media, and even non-
profit agencies like the National Consumer Law Center, use moral suasion, fear, and
misinformation about the foreclosure process to deter people from defaulting on their mortgages.
White, supra note 18, at 999-1004.
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payments over longer terms, or simply write down mortgage debts, lenders
have generally resisted calls to modify underwater mortgages.67 The Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is falling well short of its goal
to help three-to-four million families by 2012. As of December 2010,
HAMP had resulted in the permanent modification of only 520,000
mortgages.68 Although banks report that they have independently approved
3.4 million loan alterations of various kinds, evidence shows that these loan
alterations simply roll missed payments into a new mortgage and thus result
in higher monthly payments. 9
This phenomenon is fundamentally incongruent with the facts of the
financial crisis. Subprime mortgages are at the root of the financial crisis.
More responsibility should be placed on the lenders who had superior
knowledge of the financial implications of subprime mortgages and who
had an obligation to exercise due diligence in making sure the borrower
could handle the loan and that it would be sufficiently collateralized in the
event of default. The loan-to-value ratio is a critical determinant of default
risk, and lenders control the appraisal process, which sets that ratio as part
of the underwriting procedure. But the fact is, "lenders relaxed the loan-to-
value requirement as credit-default models showed that few borrowers were
'ruthless,' meaning that few borrowers would default as soon as the loan
value exceeds the market value of the home.""o This shows the basic
intention to exploit the desire for owning a home as mentioned at the
outset7' and points to a clear "moral double standard." 72
Adding insult to injury, the stinginess towards families facing
foreclosure and eviction is sharply contrasted by the hundreds of billions
lavished on the banks and other financial institutions that benefited from the
Wall Street bailout.73 "The same system that was so efficient at creating
millions of mortgage loans over the past decade has been ineffective at
resolving problems in the housing market, including the efforts of
homeowners to modify their mortgages."74 As John Taylor, president and
CEO of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, explained to the
FCIC,
67. Id. at 973.
68. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 405.
69. Id.
70. Kerry D. Vandell, Handing Over the Keys: A Perspective on Mortgage Default Research,
21 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N. 211, 224 (1993).
71. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3.
72. White, supra note 18, at 1009.
73. Martinez, supra note 49, at 1. See also FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5,
at xii. ("Executives at Merrill Lynch awarded $3.6 billion in bonuses to employees in 2008, with
$121 million going to four top executives.").
74. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 405.
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There was a fundamental change in our financial services sector
that is the reason we are in this crisis . . . . [A] few hundred
thousand people, even a million people going into foreclosure you
can kind of blame them and say 'you should have known better.'
But 15 or 16 million American families can't all be wrong. They
can't all be greedy and they can't all be stupid.
This perspective invokes the admonition of the FCIC that blaming the
crisis on mortal flaws such as greed and hubris is an oversimplification. The
invitation to delve deeper into human nature in order to understand the
crisis seems particularly appropriate in light of the banking industry's
recalcitrant attitude toward paying executive salaries and bonuses with
bailout funds vis-a-vis their general resistance to offering loan
modifications and proceeding with foreclosure even when the process has
been shown to be flawed and illegal." Only when Bank of America,
JPMorgan Chase, Ally Financial, and other big mortgage lenders admitted
that they had falsified hundreds of thousands of foreclosure documents filed
with state courts around the country did the Obama administration intervene
and call for a moratorium on foreclosures. Congressional Democrats and
state officials of both parties joined the call for a temporary halt to
foreclosures, and the sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, which includes
Chicago, suspended enforcement of eviction orders."
The flawed foreclosure process got so bad that in the fall of 2010, all 50
state attorneys general joined together to investigate the matter. Some of the
main problems revolve around the so-called "robo-signers" who processed
as many as 10,000 foreclosures a month. The FCIC Report also cites gaps
in the chain of title, back-dating of documents, false affidavits, failure to
establish legal standing to foreclose, and invalid notarizations as general
flaws in the foreclosure process."
The flawed foreclosure process did not come as a surprise to some.
75. Id. at 404.
76. As Adam J. Levitin explained, foreclosure is either less costly or more profitable than
modification. About 40% of mortgages are not being serviced by a third party, but instead are on
banks' books. The banks do not want to recognize the losses on these loans, which they would
have to do immediately if they were to modify the loans. The $426 billion in second lien
mortgages out there are almost all on Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells
Fargo. That amount is roughly equal to the market capitalization of those four banks and if they
started writing off their second lien mortgages they would be insolvent. If the loans default,
however, "the bank can stretch out the period of time before foreclosure," thus "stretching out the
time before it has to recognize the loss." See Mortgage Services and Foreclosure Practices:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. of Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Adam J. Levitin, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law), http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/NominationHearing2.
77. Martinez, supra note 49, at 1.
78. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 407-08.
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Michael Orey points out that, "As the mortgage market crumbled, a number
of major law firms formed subprime litigation SWAT teams ready to tackle
an expected deluge of lawsuits from both individuals and institutions."79
The FCIC acknowledged the severity of this problem when it said,
Across the market, some mortgage securities holders have sued the
issuers of those securities demanding that the issuers rescind their
purchases. If the legal challenges succeed, investors that own
mortgage-backed securities could force the issuers to buy them
back at the original price-possibly with interest. . .. The
Congressional Oversight Panel [said] . . . the consequences could
be severe.s0
On that account, pushing for a moratorium on foreclosures based on a
flawed process might produce legal evidence of fraud on the part of banks,
which would in turn provide evidence for investors to sue for recovery of
their original investments plus interest, a severe consequence. According to
Shaun Donovan, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, a
moratorium on foreclosures and evictions would "do more harm than
good."' Several officials warned that the result would be Wall Street and
international investors losing confidence in the US mortgage market.82 "The
major banks resumed foreclosure proceedings after a brief halt and are on
course to accelerate their efforts" in 2011 . 3 Likewise, politicians, banks,
and the media continued their assault on homeowners considering strategic
default.84
Discouraging homeowners from strategic default and refusing to
modify underwater mortgages when banks themselves defaulted on their
credit default options seems duplicitous. However, continuing to process
foreclosures in spite of calls for a moratorium for known illegalities (which
investors can use as grounds for rescinding the deals) seems
unconscionable. As Brent White says, "the asymmetry of moral norms for
borrowers and market norms for lenders gives lenders an unfair advantage
in negotiations related to the enforcement of contractual rights and
obligations, including the borrower's right to exercise strategic default,"
which the lenders have exploited."
What White refers to as an "asymmetry of moral norms for borrowers
79. Michael Orey, Waiting for the Subprime Lawsuits, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2008, at 34.
80. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 408.
81. Martinez, supra note 49, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. White, supra note 18, at 1011.
85. Id. at l011-12.
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and market norms for lenders" might more accurately be described as two
disparate ethical paradigms operating at the same time. Chairman of the
House Committee on Oversight and Government, Henry Waxman,
reiterated this notion when he said, "there seem to be two economic realities
operating in our country today. Most Americans live in a world where
economic security is precarious and there are real economic consequences
for failure. But our nation's top executives seem to live by a different set of
rules."" In short, there is one system of ethics for the rich and powerful and
another system of ethics for the poor and powerless.
NIETZSCHE GETS His MBA
There is at least one philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, who espouses a
dualistic system of ethics, which would account for the incongruent
behaviors in this global financial crisis. He also affords us an answer to the
question asked by the FCIC, what "human weakness" did we fail to account
for that allowed this crisis to happen?" Again, the FCIC invites a deeper
philosophical inquiry into the matter when it concludes that the problem
cannot simply be reduced to human greed or hubris, but remains a matter of
our basic human nature." This position points to the limitations of language
where the metaphysics of human nature are concerned, as well as the
tendency for humans to vacillate in their application of moral labels
depending upon their circumstances and perspectives. Nietzsche's
philosophy begins with this exact premise.
As the FCIC indicated, explaining the financial crisis in terms of greed
and hubris does nothing to help us understand the real "human weakness"
that lies at the root of the problem. Worse still, our tendency to reduce
human problems to a war of words, or metaphysical assertions expressed
inadequately and inconsistently in moral labels, reduces the real situation to
a non-sensical "chicken-and-egg" type argument. In the present situation,
the borrowers and lenders are cast opposite one another and the debate fails
to transcend the "chicken-and-egg" argument. Borrowers borrowed because
lenders lent; lenders lent because borrowers borrowed.
There is no better evidence of this than the fact that there are two
separate dissents from the majority opinion in the FCIC Report. While the
majority was clear in laying blame at the feet of the lenders (executives,
industry leaders, and public officials), the dissents, especially that of Peter
Wallison, laid more blame at the feet of borrowers. The "blame game"
surrounding the financial crisis has resulted in the vitriol exchange of moral
86. FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at 390.
87. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxiii.
88. See Id.
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labels with little progress or improvement of the real situation. 89
In Nietzsche, we find an account of human nature that goes beyond
moral labels, and in fact, destroys such labels. Nietzsche concludes that we
create our own values insofar as we assign words to actions in the naive
belief that there are free and independent "subjects" behind each action. But
for Nietzsche, "the acting man's delusion about himself [is] his assumption
that free will exists."90 Therefore, the language used to describe human
actions is not just biased; it is backwards in many cases. Our most
immediate project, then, is to transcend the moral language used to describe
events and avoid the tendency to look for "subjects" behind the actions.
Nietzsche's ethics is appropriately suited to the task.
Nietzsche's metaphysics of human nature reflect a profound
philosophical materialism resulting in an ethical paradigm that allows us to
calculate human action, but only when we remove the idea of "subjects"
from the equation. As Nietzsche says, "there is no being behind the doing,
acting, becoming; the 'doer' has simply been added to the deed by the
imagination-the doing is everything."9' A perfect illustration of this is the
status accorded corporations as "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.92 There is no "being" behind the
"doing, acting, and becoming" of a corporation, though its rights as a being
are protected by the courts. At the same time, even a cursory glance at our
legal history will show that the responsibilities of a corporation remain
vague, elusive, and hard to compel. This is especially true in the context of
the current financial crisis. Lending institutions have argued vehemently for
the protection of their rights to carry out their contractual obligations to pay
executive salaries and bonuses with federal bailout money while at the same
time defaulting on their payments to investors and avoiding legal sanction
even when fraud is evident.93
89. High-ranking officials such as Secretary Paulson and President Obama have joined in the
exchange as we mentioned previously-and it has done precious little to change the reality of the
situation. Paulson, supra note 58; Obama, supra note 59.
90. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS 273
(Marion Faber & Stephen Lehmann trans., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, No. 106 1984).
91. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 179
(Francis Golffing trans., New York: Anchor Books 1956).
92. In 1886, the United States Supreme Court decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad led to the perception of corporations as "persons," and hence the Fourteenth
Amendment became applicable even though it was designed specifically to protect the rights of
free Negroes. The most common use of the Fourteenth Amendment has been to protect the rights
of corporations as "persons," and countless courts since 1886 have struck down laws that sought
to protect individuals and communities from corporate harms as contrary to the corporation's
primary [fiduciary] duty to enrich its shareholders. This is a far cry from the original idea of a
chartered corporation in our country's first 100 years; nevertheless, it has held sway for the past
125 years as the right approach for the fruition of capitalism. Ill U.S. 394; 6 S.Ct. 1132 (1886).
93. One interesting consideration in the current financial crisis is that some of the banks used
the same irregular/illegal accounting techniques that sent some Enron executives to prison years
No. 1] Explaining the Global Financial Crisis: Nietzsche Gets His MBA
Clinging to the notion that "subjects" stand behind the social
phenomenon we investigate forces a circular reasoning. As Nietzsche says,
"the common man doubles the doing ... he states the same event once as
cause and then again as effect."94 The role of subprime mortgages in the
financial crisis is a poignant example. As Wallison argues in his dissent
from the majority view in the FCIC Report, but for the high rate of default
on the 27 million subprime mortgages, we would not have a crisis;95 but the
financial crisis exacerbated the economic conditions that forced so many
defaults. Nietzsche provides an analogy for our circular cause-and-effect
reasoning on most matters. He says, "the natural scientists are no better
when they say that 'energy moves,' 'energy causes.' For all its detachment
and freedom from emotion, our science is still the dupe of linguistic habits;
it has never yet got rid of those changelings called 'subjects."' 96 This seems
especially true in the field of economics and is the precise reason that
economics fails to predict problems and avert disasters.9 7
The FCIC shows an acute awareness of the dangers of looking for
individual "subjects" to blame, while itself placing great responsibility on
public figures and captains of the industry.9 8 It hints at the need to transcend
the limited perspective of our current values but lacks the specific direction.
In practical terms, the government of the United States has to find a way to
resolve the tension between a public which is losing confidence in a
banking system that has squandered the public trust by engaging in shoddy
and sometimes illegal practices, which the public now pays for with a
federal bailout, and those politicians that approved the bailouts. At the same
time, the government must demonstrate to investors (especially foreign
investors) that they can restore confidence in the system. As the FCIC
stated, "[t]hese are serious matters that must be addressed and resolved to
restore faith in our financial markets to avoid the next crisis . . . ."" In short,
the government has to explain its "too big to fail" approach in bailing out
the Wall Street banks-or at the very least, it must distract the public's
attention from the particular events of the crisis which appeared to reward
the moral double-standard behavior of the banks.'o Nietzsche gives context
earlier. This time around, however, no one is likely to get any prison time. In a sense, the system
has evolved even further to shield individuals from personal responsibility. For Nietzsche, this is
completely comprehensible given his understanding of ethics as a two-tiered system of values.
94. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 91, at 179.
95. See FCIC Report, supra note 3, at 456.
96. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 91, at 178-79.
97. See FCIC Report, supra note 3.
98. Id. at 4.
99. FCIC Report, supra note 3, at xxviii.
100. The Obama Administration does exactly this in its Reforming America's Housing
Finance Market: A Report to Congress, which was released February 10, 2011, and is discussed at
the end of this section. See infra note 137, at 31-35.
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and insight regarding this challenge.
Nietzsche explains the complexities of human relationships in terms of
"the oldest and most primitive relationship between human beings, that of
buyer and seller; creditor and debtor."'o' This relationship is not a
consequence of society: it is ontologically prior. Nietzsche concludes,
"purchase and sale, together with their psychological trappings, antedate
even the rudiments of social organization and covenants. From its
rudimentary manifestation in interpersonal law, the incipient sense of
barter, contract, guilt, right, obligation, compensation, was projected into
the crudest communal complexes together with the habit of measuring
power against power."'0 2 The fundamental drive underlying human nature
is, therefore, a "will to power." 0 3
First and foremost a philologist, Nietzsche arrives at his conclusions
about human nature by diving into the value system of civilized man and
redressing the basic concepts of "good" and "evil." That system shows at
every turn the influence of the anthropologists, sociologists, and, most
importantly, psychologists who have mistakenly premised the human value
system on the ideas of "utility, forgetfulness, habit, and finally, error.""
Nietzsche says of the psychologists' theory: "[O]riginally, altruistic actions
were praised and approved by their recipients, that is, by those to whom
they were useful. Later on, the origin of that praise having been forgotten,
such actions were felt to be good simply because it was the habit to
commend them."' But this cannot be the case, concludes Nietzsche, for the
judgment "good" does not originate with those to whom the good has been
done. Rather, it was the "good" (the nobility) who decreed themselves and
their actions to be "good."' 06 The real origin of the human value system,
with its basic concepts of good and bad, "is to be found in the pathos of
nobility and distance, representing the dominant temper of a higher, ruling
class in relation to a lower dependent one." 07
The existence of two classes of people, the nobility and a lesser,
dependent class of people, is not a social construct, but a brute fact of
nature. As Nietzsche says, "everything is necessity."' Suffice to say, all
men are not created equal-at least not in terms of their attributes and
abilities. Clearly, some have a higher intellectual capacity than others, and,
101. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS,supra note 91, at 202.
102. Id. (concluding, "[N]o phase of civilization, no matter how primitive, has been
discovered in which that relation did not to some extent exist.").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 159.
105. Id. at 160 ( "[O]ne would almost be justified in seeing the origin of language itself as an
expression of the rulers' power.").
106. Id
107. Id.
108. NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, supra note 90, at 274.
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historically, they have been the arbiters of language and hence morality. As
Nietzsche says:
It was the 'good' themselves, that is to say the noble, mighty,
highly placed, and high-minded who decreed themselves and their
actions to be good; i.e., belonging to the highest rank, in
contradistinction to all that was base, low-minded and plebian. It
was this pathos of distance that authorized them to create values
and name them.' 09
For the "master class," "all truly noble morality grows out of a
triumphant self-affirmation ... such values grow and act spontaneously,
seeking out their contraries only in order to affirm themselves."" 0
Practically speaking, "the noble lives before his own conscience with
confidence and frankness,""' and as Nietzsche sees it, this person acts with
power in the pursuit of power; he is "the original founder of the state and he
subjects to himself those who are weaker."" 2 The noble regards himself as a
determiner of values-a creator of values-and he does not require the
approval of others."'
The noble's valuations "may go amiss and do violence to reality, but
this happens only with regard to spheres which they do not know well,"" 4
offers Nietzsche. This is precisely what happened when lenders relaxed the
loan-to-value-ratio because their research showed that "few borrowers were
'ruthless enough' to default as soon as the loan value exceeded the market
value of the home."" 5
According to Nietzsche, the moral psychologists have mistakenly
associated the word "good" with altruistic deeds. Contrary to this
commonly accepted view, continues Nietzsche, "there is no a priori
necessity for associating 'good' with altruistic deeds.""' In fact, Nietzsche
points out that "the very etymology of the term 'good' leads us back to the
basic concept of 'noble' in the hierarchical, class sense, and from this has
developed by historical necessity, the concept 'good' embracing nobility of
mind, spiritual distinction.""' The psychologists' association between
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"good" and altruistic deeds is "unhistorical, and amateurish,
and.. .intrinsically unsound,""' says Nietzsche. More importantly, this
mistaken assumption leads to a "herd instinct" which reduces all moral
valuations to an "egoism-altruism dichotomy" which is wholly
unproductive and fundamentally unnatural.11 9 "To expect that strength will
not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to
have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to expect
that weakness will manifest itself as strength." 20
The "herd instinct" is the ethical foundation of the "slave class," and it
"begins by saying no to an 'other.' It requires for its inception a sphere
different from and hostile to its own . .. it requires an outside stimulus in
order to act at all; all its action is reaction."121 It does not create values and
it does not determine values; rather, it reacts to the values posed by the
master class and searches for 'subjects' to assign responsibility:
Small wonder, then, that the repressed and smoldering emotions of
vengeance and hatred have taken advantage of this superstition and
in fact espouse no belief more ardently than that it is within the
discretion of the strong to be weak, of a bird of prey to be a lamb.
Thus they assume the right of calling the bird of prey to account for
being a bird of prey. 12 2
From this follows the habit of the slave class to use moral labels such as
bad, evil, exploitative, and immoral. For Nietzsche, this is unproductive.
First, it ignores the reality of human nature. Second, it won't have any
impact because "it is a sign of strong, rich temperaments that they cannot
for long take seriously their enemies, their misfortunes, their misdeeds; for
such characters have in them an excess of plastic curative power, and also a
power of oblivion." 23 Thus, members of the master class appear aloof,
indifferent, impenitent, and unconcerned for the plight of those in the slave
class. But the simple fact is, "the inherited feeling of being a higher being,
with higher pretensions, makes one rather cold, and leaves the conscience at
peace."124 This, more than anything else, infuriates the slave class and
results in the slave class hurling epithets at the members of the master class.
We see plenty of evidence of this in the current crisis, as when Angelo
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Mozilo boldly reminded the nation in a 2007 Business Week interview how
he had created $25 billion in value for shareholders.12 5 He was incredulous
toward the public's outrage at his $400 million profit from the sale of stock
options while Countrywide was collapsing and his subsequent $100 million
severance package when Countrywide was bought by Bank of America.126
According to Nietzsche, the animosity of the slave class ignores the
reality of human nature and obscures the root of the problem, thereby
setting the stage for it to happen again. "We don't accuse nature of
immorality when it sends a thunderstorm and makes us wet; why do we
consider the injurious man immoral? Because in the first case, we assume
necessity, and in the second case, a voluntarily governing free will. But this
distinction is in error."l 27 So complete is Nietzsche's commitment to
philosophical materialism that he suggests, "it should be stressed that all
tables of values, all moral injunctions, with which history and anthropology
concern themselves, require first and foremost a physiological investigation
and interpretation and next critique on the part of medical science." 28 The
plain fact is we are left with a master morality and a slave morality, and the
natural condition is that, "the welfare of the many and the welfare of the
few are radically opposite ends. To consider the former a priori the higher
value may be left to the nalvet6 of English biologists." 29
What the slave class considers exploitation is part and parcel of human
nature according to Nietzsche:
Exploitation does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and
primitive society: it belongs to the nature of living being as a
primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to
Power, which is precisely the Will to Life. Granting that as a theory
this is a novelty-as a reality it is the fundamental fact of all history
let us be so far honest towards ourselves.130
Moral systems inform the "will to power" in each person and differ
according to the class a person is born into. The moral system of the noble
class, or "aristocracy" as Nietzsche sometimes calls it, grows out of
triumphant self-affirmation. Their actions are "good" because they emanate
from the noble. The moral system of the slave class is always a reaction to
something outside themselves; essentially, it is a reaction to the actions of
125. In spite of his huge personal gains, Mozilo demanded that Countrywide pay the taxes on
his wife's travel on the corporate jet. See FERRELL, FRAEDRICH & FERRELL, supra note 5, at 390.
126. Id.
127. NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, supra note 90, at 271.
128. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 91, at 188.
129. Id. at 188.
130. FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE, GREAT TRADITIONS IN ETHICS, supra note 113, at 217-18.
93
94 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VII
the nobility. This means that each class fails to understand the other class.
Nietzsche leaves us with this perspective:
When a rich man takes a possession from a poor man. . .the poor
man misunderstands. He thinks that the rich man must be a villain
to take from him the little he has. The rich man does not feel the
value of a particular possession so deeply because he has many ...
so he cannot put himself in the place of the poor man, and he is by
no means doing as great an injustice as the poor man believes. Each
has a false idea of the other.'
This seems a particularly accurate description of the financial crisis and
foreclosure scandal.
With this level of misunderstanding, it is very unlikely that any
resolution can be achieved; that is, no justice will be found-at least not
that both classes would agree upon. According to Nietzsche, "[t]he initial
character of justice is barter," but in its complete realization, "justice is
requital and exchange on the assumption of approximately equal positions
of strength."' 32 We see this level of justice achieved between members of
the same class: banks and the government of the United States setting the
terms of the bailout. "Justice, at this level, is good will operating among
men of roughly equal power, their readiness to come to terms with one
another, to strike compromise."' 3 3
However, between members of different classes, the lenders and the
borrowers in this case, who are not approximately equal, it is very likely
that borrowers will have to accept the terms offered by the lenders.1" As
Nietzsche says, "in the case of others less powerful, [the lenders will] force
them to accept such a compromise."3 3 For borrowers with underwater
mortgages who might consider using strategic default as a bargaining chip
to renegotiate the terms of their mortgages, Nietzsche offers this analogy:
If one party, a city under siege, for example, submits under certain
conditions to a greater power, its reciprocal condition is that the
first party can destroy itself, burn the city, and thus make the power
suffer a great loss. Thus, there is a kind of equalization on the basis
of which rights can be established. Preservation is to the enemy's
advantage. Rights exist between slaves and masters to the same
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extent, exactly insofar as the possession of his slave is profitable
and important to the master. The right originally extends as far as
the one appears to the other to be valuable, essential, permanent,
invincible, and the like. In this regard, even the weaker of the two
has rights, though they are modest.1'
Based on this analysis, we can assume that the larger the (underwater)
mortgage, the more likely the bank is to be willing to work with the
borrower on a loan modification. Meanwhile, those mortgages that are
small and pertain to less valuable properties are more likely to be foreclosed
upon. This is precisely what is happening in the United States, and
Nietzsche's view is prophetic.
True to Nietzsche's form, the Obama administration announced on
February 10, 2011, a new strategy for Reforming America's Housing
Finance Market.'7 This strategy includes provisions to "improve the
treatment of lien property" so the modification process will be easier for
those middle and upper class Americans who took out second mortgages to
buy bigger and better properties, second properties, or personal property,
and now are underwater.138
Meanwhile, the Obama administration's strategy includes several
elements that will make it considerably more difficult for low-income
individuals to buy a home. For example, the strategy calls for a decrease in
the maximum loan size that qualifies for Federal Housing Assistance
insurance-making it more difficult for low-income families to buy a
home. 139 This is a clear pronouncement of Nietzsche's master-slave
dichotomy and a manifestation of master ethics and the pathos of
distance.'40
The overall goal of the Housing Finance Market Reform Report to
Congress (Reform Report) is to reduce the federal government's role in the
mortgage industry, by "unwinding" Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, thereby
shifting the bulk of the entire mortgage industry over to the private sector-
the same private sector that created the mortgage-backed securities and
credit default swaps that crashed the global market and then paid exorbitant
salaries and bonuses to their executives as the market crashed. All of these
facts are conspicuously missing from this latest congressional report. Few
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philosophers or economists can make sense of this, save for Nietzsche. This
is like putting the "birds of prey" (as Nietzsche calls the master class) in
charge of the "sheep" (the slave class). The master class, of course, blames
the indiscretion of the slaves for the financial crisis, as reflected in the
dissent from the FCIC Report and in the Obama administration's plan for
reform, yet they harbor no animosity toward them. "We have nothing
against these good lambs," say the birds of prey, "nothing tastes better than
a tender lamb."'41
The language adopted in the aftermath of the financial crisis is perhaps
the clearest indication that Nietzsche's master-slave dichotomy is real and
in play, and that the birds of prey will forever remain birds of prey. The
Reform Report is strikingly similar to Peter Wallison's dissenting view in
the FCIC Report insofar as it puts the blame on the risky mortgages made to
people with poor credit and on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for issuing
those loans. This emphasis is counter-factual even by the Reform Report's
own presentation of the facts. The Reform Report acknowledges that
"initially, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were largely on the sidelines while
private markets generated increasingly risky mortgages. Between 2001 and
2005, private-label securitizations of Alt-A and subprime mortgages grew
five-fold, yet Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to primarily
guarantee fully documented, high-quality mortgages."l4 2 Yet, the Reform
Report focuses on the $130 billion it took to bail out Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, a mere pittance compared to the bailout costs of the private
equity firms, so that it can "pave the way for a robust private mortgage
market... by winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac."'4 3
The Reform Report also decries the "preferential tax treatment and the
lower capital requirements" that gave Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
advantages which helped them "dominate the market," things which they
successfully lobbied for in Washington, and this was unfair to the private
sector.'" But this doesn't really square with the Reform Report's analysis
that shows Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's combined market share in the
mortgage industry dropped from 70% of new loan originations in 2003,
down to 40% in 2006.
In essence, the government is setting up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
as the scapegoats for the industry while paving the way for the master class
bankers to take a larger role in the very industry they corrupted and
collapsed. This position reverses the government's position from 1968
when it concluded that we (as a nation) should work to facilitate home
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ownership for more people-a view that every administration from Johnson
to George W. Bush embraced-and follow a new idea that "not everyone
should own a home."'4 5 The Obama administration poses this
recommendation without pretense or apology, as though it were common
sense that some people are not worthy of owning a home, and it spends two
and half pages in the Reform Report touting its "renewed commitment to
affordable rental housing."146
This, again, appears counter-factual given the Reform Report's
statement that,
In the past, broader government efforts to support affordability
through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's affordable housing goals
proved inefficient and ineffective. Their affordability goals were
inadequately responsive to the unique needs of underserved
families and communities. They were misaligned with lending in
the primary market. And most egregiously, they did not exclude
high-cost, predatory loans.147
Not only were many low-income borrowers not accommodated by the
affordable housing goals, but many of those who did qualify were
victimized by predatory lenders. A more obvious inconsistency in the
Reform Report is that while the blame is laid at the feet of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the fact is that their defaults were not nearly as high as those
in the private sector. According to the Reform Report, "Delinquency rates
on many private-label securities and other loans held by banks and other
private market institutions were far higher than on the loans held by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, including loans qualifying for the affordability
goals."' 4 8 Yet, the goal of the mortgage market reform is to "pave the way
for a robust private mortgage market." 49
The Obama administration's position focuses on the deficiencies of the
slave class in a very matter-of-fact manner. "The losses that the federal
government has covered at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under HERA
authority are virtually all attributable to bad loans that those firms took on
during the height of the housing bubble."' This statement ignores other
facts from the Reform Report, like Fannie and Freddie's declining role in
the mortgage industry after 2003, the predatory lending in the private
sector, and the fact that Fannie and Freddie were "on the sidelines" when
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the private sector went crazy with mortgaged backed securities and funky
derivatives.
Again, the Reform Report looks very much like Peter Wallison's
dissent in the FCIC Report and nothing like the majority view. Here,
Nietzsche would say, "did you expect the master class to take responsibility
and perform a public mea culpa?" It is not in their nature, says Nietzsche,
and anyone who expects that betrays his status as a member of the slave
class.
So, the long and short of it is that the government allowed the sheep to
get eaten by the birds of prey. When the birds of prey got sick from over-
eating, the government blamed the sheep for being too fat. This reversal is
again something Nietzsche predicts of human nature. "The aristocrat will,
on occasion, misjudge a sphere which he holds in contempt, the sphere of
the common man, the people."' Yet, the master class will not demonize
the slave class (though the inverse is not true): "there is in all contempt too
much casualness and nonchalance ... to make of its object a downright
caricature and monster."' 52 In fact, the master class will simply restructure
things in order to find new ways to exercise the will to power over the slave
class.
Nietzsche offers insight into what our politicians will probably do. "The
rulers," says Nietzsche:
[D]eflect the attention of their subjects from the particular injury
and, in the long run, achieve the opposite end from that sought by
vengeance, which tries to make the viewpoint of the injured person
prevail exclusively. Henceforth, the eye is trained to view the deed
ever more impersonally-even the eye of the offended person.'
This process is controlled by the manipulation of normative language
by the master class as we have seen in Brent White's research.' 54 Similarly,
we can see the shift in tone from the FCIC Report to the Obama
Administration's Reforming America's Housing Finance Market Report to
Congress. Moving forward, we can expect less blame on the banking
industry and lenders, and more emphasis on the responsibility of individual
borrowers.
This follows Nietzsche's perspective on the trajectory of society
perfectly. "The higher must not be made an instrument of the lower; the
pathos of distance must to all etemity keep separate tasks separate ....
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[nobility] must guard against. .. unrelieved loathing of man and unrelieved
pity of him."' Therefore, the masters must regroup and redirect the will to
power to the recovery of the economic order and that requires being
indifferent toward the suffering of those negatively impacted by the crisis.
This follows Nietzsche's fundamental claim that pity is "the most sinister
symptom of our sinister civilization" and "whoever sticks with it" will be
invaded by "suspicion, distrust, and fear."'56 Thus, the recovery is not so
much an economic task as it is a job for the master class (American
politicians and members of the banking industry) to convince other
members of the master class (global investors) that they have control over
their slave class. This directly involves the metaphysics of economics
insofar as the goal is to regain "trust" and inspire "confidence" in the
economic system-something that the Obama administration has stressed
repeatedly-and, in short, to restore a sense of balance.
"Balance," as such, "is the precondition of all covenants and hence all
law,"' according to Nietzsche. And, as we have seen, this is a matter of
"justice," which "is goodwill operating among men of equal power."'
Law, in the sphere of global economics, is paramount because it provides a
mechanism of recovery should the balance of interests become unequal. "It
follows that only after a corpus of laws has been established can there be
any talk of 'right' and 'wrong."" 59 That corpus of laws has already taken
shape under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.'60According to the Obama administration, under the Dodd-Frank Act,
[T]he Administration will mobilize all tools available to address the
nation's broken system of mortgage servicing and foreclosure
processing. Taken together, these steps [winding down Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac and the Dodd-Frank Act] will help restore trust in
the underlying foundation of the mortgage market so borrowers,
lenders, and investors have the confidence to purchase a home,
issue a loan, or make an investment.'
CONCLUSION
The global financial crisis has its roots in the idea that homeownership
has considerable ontological significance and we would be better off as a
society if more people had an opportunity to own a home. Wide-spread
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homeownership was facilitated by the creation of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac for the express purpose of making housing affordable to more people.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's success led members of the private sector,
like Countrywide, to demand an opportunity to participate in the mortgage
market more freely.
In the hands of the private sector, affordable housing standards were
subsequently exploited and many new forms of mortgages were invented as
well as new derivatives such as the credit default swaps which proved
immensely popular with global investors. Pressure from the banking
industry led to a loosening of mortgage rules and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act allowed commercial banks to expand into these diverse and speculative
activities. The financial incentives overwhelmed reason and many people
ignored the warning signs of an inmminent collapse.
Somewhere along the line, the mortgage industry lost its focus. It was
no longer about affordable housing for people in order to make a stronger
society, but about using houses as commodities. By 2005, one out of every
ten home loans was to an investor, speculator, or someone buying a second
home. Re-financing homes and spending the cash equity on personal
property and other things became prolific: from $460 billion in 2000 to $2.8
trillion in 2003. In pursuit of higher profits, lenders ignored the
requirements of due diligence by servicing liar loans and engaging in
predatory practices like relaxing the loan-to-value ratio. They did so based
on their research, which showed that few borrowers were "ruthless" enough
to default as soon as the loan value exceeded the home value.162 At the same
time, lenders shirked their fiduciary duties by masking the risk behind the
mortgage-backed securities they were selling to investors.
As the financial market began its meltdown, economists were at a loss
to explain what went wrong or where we were headed. Mounting
foreclosures on one end and banking bailouts on the other end pointed to
the asymmetry of moral norms for borrowers and market norms for lenders
with a general public trapped in between. The actions of the banking
industry and the government at times appeared duplicitous. With 10-15
million mortgages still underwater, we are not out of the woods yet, and no
single theory, economic or otherwise, seems capable of encompassing the
totality of the situation-save for one, Friedrich Nietzsche.
Nietzsche offers us a view of two opposite moral paradigms that helps
us make sense of the apparent inconsistencies in the behavior of the
individuals and the institutions involved in the financial crisis. His view
helps us understand how banks can default on their obligations, demand a
bailout from the federal government and then foreclose (illegally, in many
cases) on individual homeowners who they induced into adjustable rate
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mortgages by appealing to their selfish material interests. His view helps us
understand how the important political actors, members of the media,
mortgage bankers, and other members of the master class can preach the
virtues of honoring contracts and paying one's debts while structuring
bailouts for those who abandoned these virtues. His view can explain how a
"strategic default" for an individual homeowner is "wrong," while an
"efficient breach of contract" for a corporation is "right." His view can help
us understand how we can lay blame at the feet of the private banks and yet
turn around and offer them more control of the mortgage market in the
future as part of our recovery plan.
Economists fail to identify and explain these phenomena because the
metaphysical underpinnings of their theories don't seem to "cut nature at
the joints" as some have argued.' Nietzsche's philosophy avoids the
debate over "natural kinds" insofar as he states very clearly that the origin
of all human behavior resides in the creditor-debtor relationship.164 The
creditors will always come out on top because they control the debtors-
who are indebted to them for the very language they must use to describe
their relationship. It is in this relationship that the human, "for the first time,
measured himself against another individual,"' 65 and so it is part-and-parcel
of being human and will never end.
Thus, the problem is much more complex than just human greed or
hubris-as the FCIC Report encourages us to consider. It is the age old
measuring of power against power. Now the game is to see if we can repair
the damage and move forward-and that requires transcending the
normative language of the financial crisis, which holds us back. The human
"weakness" identified by the FCIC is precisely the slave-like tendency to
mire social problems in incessant normative debates, which is precisely
what Nietzsche seeks to avoid. Rather, we must transcend these debates and
unleash the will to power with courage. Already, the Obama administration
and the banking industry are moving beyond the simplistic discussions of
right and wrong and greed and ignorance. And if we understand Nietzsche's
dual system of ethics, then the economic trajectory of the U.S. economy and
the global economy is fairly clear. Birds of prey live nobly and eat ...
sheep live in fear and bleat.
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